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MUNICIPAL FINANCE-CORPORATE SECURITIES: THE EYE OF 
A STORM-Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply Sys­
tem, 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 
2154 (1985). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 15,1983, the Supreme Court of Washington invalidated 
a contract ultimately causing the largest municipal bond default in his­
tory.1 Because the ruling2 affected at least 78,000 bondholders and the 
bond3 default generated approximately 70 lawsuits, a large audience 
followed the appeal. 4 
Chemical Bank v. Washington Public Power Supply SystemS posed 
the issue whether tax-exempt municipal bonds that the Washington 
Public Power Supply System (System)6 had issued to finance the con­
struction of two nuclear power plants to supply electricity to 88 differ­
ent publicly-owned utilities would be repaid. 7 When the System's 
inability to obtain further financing forced it to terminate the project, 8 
the issue became whether the electric ratepayers or the bond purchas­
ers would pay the architectural, engineering, and construction costs 
incurred before the date of termination.9 
This note will explore how the Supreme Court of Washington in 
1. Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 
P.2d 329 (1983). See also, Wall St. J., June 16, 1983, at 3, col. 2. 
2. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at D22, col. 6. 
3. Alexander, Whoops! A $2 Billion Blunder, Time, August 8, 1983, at 50. 
4. On November 6, 1984, the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed its June 15, 
1983 decision. 691 P.2d 524 (Wash. 1984). 
5. 99 Wash. 2d 772, 666 P.2d 329 (1983). 
6. See infra notes 11-20 and accompanying text. 
7. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 777-78, 666 P.2d at 332. 
8. Id. Moody's Investor Service had suspended credit ratings on the System's bonds. 
N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at D22, col. 5: see also Brown, The Paper World, Wash. Post, 
Dec. 5, 1984, at A17, col. 1. 
9. Unlike privately-owned utilities, publicly-owned utilities have no stockholders 
who could share the risk of a terminated project. For a discussion of the issues involved 
when a private utility cancels a nuclear generating facility, see Note, Electric Utility Rate 
Regulation: Regulating The Shock: Abandonment of Nuclear Power Plant Construction, 7 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 961 (1985). 
Also, the System could not accept the business risk of cancellation because it had no 
source of revenue apart from payments from the participants. See infra notes 27-29 and 
accompanying text. 
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Chemical Bank resolved the battle between the ratepayers and the 
bondholders, ignoring a controlling line of cases to reach its result. By 
freeing the ratepayers from arm's-length contracts that required their 
suppliers to pay the non-recoverable costs of terminated nuclear power 
plants, the decision in Chemical Bank will prevent the bondholders 
from receiving $7.2 billion over a thirty year period. 1O 
II. BACKGROUND 
The System is an operating agencyll and a municipal corpora­
tion l2 established under Washington law.B In 1983,14 23 municipal 
utilities and public utility districts constituted its members. IS The leg­
islation governing the operation of the System mandates a board of 
directors with one representative on the board for each member. 16 It 
also requires that the board make management and control 
decisions. 17 
As conceived, the System would enable small publicly-owned 
utilities to achieve greater market powerl8 when purchasing wholesale 
electricity or building generating facilities, thereby maintaining rates 
that would be competitive with larger, often privately-owned, utili­
ties. 19 The cost of a particular project could be decreased under en­
10. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 776, 666 P.2d at 331. 
11. Id. An operating agency is a consortium of governmental units formed to pro­
vide economic service by pooling resources to achieve increased market power. Ferdon, 
Power Utilities Realize Cost Benefits on Joint Agency Take or Pay Contracts, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 
25, 1982, at 17, col. 1. 
12. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 777, 666 P.2d at 331. 
13. Id. 
14. Alexander, supra note 3, at 51. 
15. Id. A public utility district is a municipal corporation which buys and sells 
power, al)d its service territory may encompass several municipalities. WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 54.04.020-.030 (1962). 
16. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.370 (1983). 
17. Id. It is important that the representatives of the ratepayers freely entered agree­
ments in which they knowingly accepted the risk that the plants might have to be termi­
nated especially when considering their responsibility for repaying the bonds. Brown, 
supra note 8, at 1. 
18. See Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17, col. 2. 
19. In Chemical Bank the large scale plant took the form of a nuclear power station, 
a project that the participants would not have been able to construct themselves. Chemi­
cal's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at 78, Chemical 
Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., No. 82-2-06840-3 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1982) 
[hereinafter referred to as Chemical's Memorandum]; see Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17, col. 
2. 
The idea of promoting competition in the electric utility industry by encouraging the 
public ownership of generating facilities dates back to 1920. 16 U.S.c. § 800(a)(1976) 
(granting a preference to public bodies in the licensing of hydroelectric facilities); see also 
City 0/ Bountiful. Utah. Opinion No. 88, 11 FERC para. 61,337 (1980), affd sub nom. 
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abling legislation that permits the System to enter into contracts 
"relating to the purchase, sale, interchange or wheeling of power" 
with any governmental unit or utility.20 
With the goal of supplying needed energy at the lowest cost, the 
System formed in 195721 under a statute that authorized operating 
agencies to generate electricity, employ professional services, and 
study the development of electric generating facilities. 22 The System 
decided to begin constructing two additional nuclear generating facili­
ties in 1974.23 Prior to undertaking the project, however, the System 
needed approval of a majority of the governing bodies of its 
members.24 
Eighty-eight member and non-member utilities subsequently 
signed participation agreements in which the System promised to pro­
vide a specific percentage of project capability25 and the utilities prom­
ised to pay a specific percentage of the project's annual budget.26 
Because the System would finance construction costs for each partici­
pant utility until the facility produced power, it drafted the agreement 
to require each participant to reimburse the System for borrowed 
funds even if it never completed the project.27 The System deemed the 
language necessary because as an operating agency, it could raise capi­
tal only through revenues from sales and bonds that would be repaid 
by the revenue.28 Further, the provision was equitable because if an 
Alabama Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulation Com'n, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3573 (1983); 16 U.S.c. 936(b)(1)(l976) (directing that 50% of the 
inexpensive electricity produced at the federally-financed project at Niagra Falls be sold to 
public bodies for the use of residential customers). 
20. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.391 (1983). 
21. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 773, 666 P.2d at 331. 
22. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.300 (1983). 
23. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 773, 666 P.2d at 331. The System had already 
begun construction on three others. Id. One past president of the System compared the 
1970's nuclear expansion with the foresighted hydroelectric development of the Columbia 
River, exemplified by such projects as the Grand Coulee Darn. Brown, Darkness to Dawn, 
Wash. Post, Dec. 2, 1984, at A21, col. 2. 
24. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.360 (1983). 
25. 'Project Capability' is defined in section l(v) of the agreement as: the 
amounts of electric power and energy, if any, which the Projects are capable of 
generating at any particular time (including times when either or both of the 
Plants are not operable or operating or the operation thereof is suspended, inter­
rupted, interfered with, reduced or curtailed, in each case in whole or in part for 
any reason whatsover), less project station use and losses. 
Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 778, 666 P.2d at 332. 
26. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 777, 666 P.2d at 332. 
27. Even in 1976 termination presented a large enough risk to require an agreement 
to address risk allocation. Id.; see Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17-18. 
28. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.300(6) (1983). The System, therefore, could 
not feasibly assume the risk of termination because of its total dependence on the parties 
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individual participant built a project by itself, it could legally service 
the debt incurred to finance a terminated facility.29 
Elected public officials made the power supply decisions for the 
public utility districts that signed the agreement.30 Although some of­
ficials who served on the governing boards received nominal compen­
sation,3! they had been delegated the delicate and technical task of 
searching for and contracting the most inexpensive supply of electric­
ity which would be reliably available in 15 or 20 years. 32 
In 1976, the agreement which the System offered represented a 
low cost energy supply33 that the officials believed forecasts of a grow­
ing demand for electricity necessitated. 34 The increasing demand ren­
dered the probability of termination small though existent. 35 After 
reviewing studies, the officials chose what they judged the best product 
on the market, even with the risk that ratepayers might pay construc­
tion costs but ultimately receive no electricity.36 
The agreement provided the participants with a method of con­
trolling management decisions37 and each would be guaranteed per­
centage of the units output if the project were completed. 38 Although 
the agreement did not precisely follow the procedure for nuclear de­
velopment delineated in the Washington statutes, it did create a com­
with which it had contracted for construction and operating capital. Ferdon, supra note 
11, at 17-18. The legislative scheme of an operating agency rendered it little more than a 
shell composed of governmental units which used it for the financing, construction, and 
operation of electric generating facilities. Note, Chemical Bank v. Washington Public 
Power Supply System, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1094, 1116-17 (1984). 
29. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.3411 (1983). 
30. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 54.12.010 (West Supp. 1985). Being elected, a board 
would theoretically not act contrary to the perceived desires of its ratepayers. 
31. Brown, supra note 23, at A21, col. 2. The annual revenue of a public utility 
district determines the compensation scheme for each district's commissioner. WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 54.12.080 (West Supp. 1985). 
32. Brown, Prophets ofShortage, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 1984, at A18, col. 3. 
33. Cook, Nuclear Follies, Forbes, Feb. 11, 1985, at 84. 
34. Brown, supra note 32, at A 18, col. 1. 
35. The main object of the agreement was to generate electric power, even though 
section 6 provided for payments to the System regardless of whether it completed the 
projects. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 778, 666 P.2d at 332. 
36. Apparently, a seller's market existed, since the Bonneville Power Administration 
(BP A) sent a letter to the participants stating that a constant supply of electricity could be 
guaranteed only if they accepted the agreements. Brown, supra note 32, at A18, col. 1. 
37. Note, supra note 28, at 1110-12. Section 15 of the agreement mandated the es­
tablishment of a participants' committee to oversee the management of the projects. Chem­
ical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 787, 666 P.2d at 337. 
38. The agreement provided that the participant would purchase a share of the "elec­
tric power and energy, if any, which the Projects are capable of generating at any particular 
time." Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 778, 666 P.2d at 332. 
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parable relationship. 39 In return for the System's promise to sell a 
portion of the facilities' capability, each participant promised to collect 
rates sufficient to service the System's project-related debt.40 Further, 
each participant delivered to the System an opinion of its counsel that 
the agreement was enforceable in accordance with its terms.4\ 
On January 22, 1982, the System's directors determined that the 
System would be unable to obtain financing to complete the facilities 
and voted to terminate both projects.42 Prior to termination, the Sys­
tem had issued $2.25 billion of tax-exempt municipal revenue bonds to 
finance the cost of architectural, engineering, and construction services 
associated with the projects.43 A complex bond resolution that the 
System's directors adopted on February 23, 1977 governed issuance 
and repayment of the bonds.44 Among other matters, it appointed 
Chemical Bank as trustee for the bondholders.45 
As trustee, Chemical Bank brought a declaratory judgment ac­
tion in the Superior Court for King County, Washington, against the 
System and each participant seeking a ruling that the participants 
were contractually obligated to pay the System an amount sufficient to 
service the principal and interest on the bonds.46 After reviewing an 
overwhelming amount of oral and written argument, the trial court 
ruled in favor of Chemical Bank.47 Several participants then appealed 
and the Washington Supreme Court granted review' of the partici­
pants' statutory authority to enter the agreement that formed the se­
curity for the bonds.48 
Writing for the majority, Justice Brachtenback held that the par­
ticipants had exceeded their statutory authority because the agreement 
represented neither a "purchase of electricity" nor an "acquisition of 
39. Under the joint development statute, participants receive an ownership interest, 
but they still must pay construction costs if a project is cancelled, even though they will 
never receive electricity. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 54.55.010-030 (West Supp. 1985). 
40. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 778, 666 P.2d at 332. 
41. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. 
42. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 776, 666 P.2d at 331; See Brown, supra note 8, at 
AI7, col. 3. Although individuals affiliated with the member publicly-owned utilities con­
trol the board, the board's executive committee is specifically required to consider its inter­
est to be the same as the interests of "all ratepayers affected by the joint operating agency." 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.374(3) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). The lan­
guage is broad enough to require the board to analyze the interests of non-member partici­
pant ratepayers as well as those of members. . 
43. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 776, 666 P.2d at 331. 
44. Id. at 777, 666 P.2d at 332. 
45. Id. at 776, 666 P.2d at 331. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 780-81, 666 P.2d at 333-34. 
48. Id. at 781, 666 P.2d at 334. 
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an electric generating facility" and declared the contracts void.49 The 
Court announced its decision on June 15, 1983. On July 25, 1983, the 
System sent notice to Chemical Bank that it could not fund the next 
semi-annual interest payment due on the bonds and that it was in de­
fault under the terms of the bond resolution. 50 
III. ANALYSIS 
Chapter 43.52 of the Washington Code regulates the formation 
and operation of governmental agencies such as the System.51 Under 
section 391, the System possesses the power to "make contracts for 
any term relating to the purchase, sale, interchange or wheeling of 
power" with any public body or utility. 52 Under the statute, therefore, 
the System's has quite broad authority to contract for the purchase or 
sale of electricity.53 
Under Section 43.52.300, operating agencies have the additional 
power to enter into contracts with any public body for the "construc­
tion of all or any part of any electric generating [facility]."54 The rela­
tionship created by the agreement between the System and each 
participant shows that their purpose was to finance and construct elec­
tric generating facilities. 55 
The Supreme Court of Washington has addressed the issue of 
contractual authority many times. In 1933, the court announced in 
Abrams v. Seattle56 that it would follow its prior rule and apply the 
same standard of contract enforceability to a municipal utility as to a 
private individual. 57 Courts of other states strictly construe contracts 
in favor of municipalities.58 In Seattle, Abrams sought an injunction 
against the city to prevent payments to private entrepreneurs who had 
constructed an electric substation on city-owned property, based on 
49. Id. at 799, 666 P.2d at 343. Further, the court did not require the participants to 
pay any restitution or other equitable remedy, leaving the System in a position in which it 
would be completely unable to meet its contractual obligations to the bondholders. 
50. Asinof, WPPSS Default on $2.25 Billion in Bonds is Record for Municipal Debt; 
Suits Seen, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at 3, col. 4. 
51. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.391 (1983); see generally, Ferdon, supra note 
II,atI7-18. 
52. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.52.391 (1983) (emphasis added). 
53. Even if the agreements do not represent a purchase of electricity, they undeniably 
"related to" the purchase of electrical power. See supra note 57 and accompanying test. 
54. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.53.300(3) (1983). 
55. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 782, 666 P.2d at 335. 
56. 173 Wash. 495, 23 P.2d 869 (1933). 
57. Id. at 501, 23 P.2d at 871. 
58. Id. 
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the theory that the city's lease for the property was ultra vires. 59 Rec­
ognizing the equities of the situation, the court ordered the city to pay 
the reasonable value of the services rendered on an implied contract 
theory.60 
Thirty-two years later, in the textbook case of Edwards v. Ren­
ton,61 the court cited the decision in Seattle with approval and recog­
nized that Washington would permit recovery against municipal 
corporations for ultra vires contracts in situations in which other 
states would not.62 When the City of Renton had entered an agree­
ment which was ultra vires because of the particular financial arrange­
ment, the court allowed a quasi-contractual recovery, stating that it 
recognized "ample authority from other jurisdictions which would 
deny any recovery to plaintiffs" once a municipal contract has been 
adjudicated ultra vires.63 Further, the court concluded that, unlike 
other jurisdictions, Washington would even calculate the recovery 
based on the value of the services rendered, as opposed to the value of 
the benefit received. 64 
As recently as 1974, the Washington Supreme Court acknowl­
edged a "developing tendency" to hold public bodies to the "same 
standards of conduct [as] ... private citizens."65 In Washington v. 
O'Connell,66 the court enforced invalid contracts of publicly-owned 
electric utilities because the contracts contained "mere procedural ir­
regularities" and because the court recognized that enforcement was 
"necessary to do justice between the parties. "67 
The O'Connell court recognized the general rule that parties con­
tracting with a municipality do so at their own risk, and that the law 
presumes that a party dealing with the public officer knows the limits 
of the statutory powers of the office.68 Because the rule protected the 
public treasury, the O'Connell court established an exception to the 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 503, 23 P.2d at 872. 
61. 67 Wash. 2d 598,409 P.2d 153 (1965). 
62. Id. at 606, 409 P.2d at 159. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 607, 409 P.2d at 159. Importantly, the court's conclusion represents an 
alternative basis of recovery if a fact finder were to determine that the participants received 
nothing of value. As unfortunate as it is that no electricity will ever be produced, it does 
not alter the fact that millions of dollars have nevertheless been spent by the System for 
engineering, architectural, and contracting services. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 776, 
666 P.2d at 331. 
65. Washington v. O'Connell, 83 Wash. 2d 797, 836, 523 P.2d 873, 896 (1974). 
66. 83 Wash. 2d 797, 523 P.2d 873 (1974). 
67. Id. at 835-36, 523 P.2d at 895. 
68. Id. at 827, 523 P.2d at 892. 
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rule that contracts should be strictly construed in favor of cities and 
towns for instances in which municipalities perform a proprietary 
function which does not represent a substantial threat to the tax­
payer.69 The court reasoned that because operating revenues often 
fund proprietary contracts, no serious threat existed that an imprudent 
officer could cause an astronomical increase in property taxes because 
of a bad business decision.70 
The O'Connell court reaffirmed the production and sale of elec­
tricity as a proprietary function71 and it held that when a party acting 
in good faith enters a contract with a public officer who has the appar­
ent authority to consummate the proprietary agreement, the private 
party may recover the reasonable value of the services under the the­
ory of unjust enrichment, even though the contract itself is later held 
unenforceable.72 The court concluded that when municipalities cloak 
their officers with the apparent authority to enter a contract by passing 
resolutions approving the arrangement and later acquiesce in the con­
tract's performance, they cannot rely on a procedural irregularity to 
withhold payments for services rendered.73 
The O'Connell decision rested on the policy that voiding munici­
pal contracts often produced inequitable results. 74 Consequently, the 
court noted the growing trend to treat public bodies the same as pri­
vate individuals during the adjudication of contractual disputes.75 
Four years after O'Connell, the court reviewed the legality of 
water contracts which provided security for municipal bonds issued by 
the City of Anacortes.76 In the 1978 case of Scott Paper Co. v. Ana­
cortes,77 the city attempted to increase water rates above the contract 
price, but the court refused to allow the city to renege on its promise.78 
69. Id. at 828-35, 523 P.2d at 892-95. 
70. For example, the agreement between the System and the participants provided 
that their payments can only come from revenues derived from the sale of electricity, not 
tax dollars. Memorandum of Washington Public Power Supply System in Support of 
Chemical Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to the Motions for 
Summary Judgment by Various of the Defendant Participants at V-16, Chemical Bank v. 
Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., No. 82-2-06840-3 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1982) [hereinafter re­
ferred to as System's Memorandum]; see generally, Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17. 
71. O'Connell, 83 Wash. 2d at 834, 523 P.2d at 895. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 836, 523 P.2d at 896. 
75. Id. 
76. Scott Paper Co. v. Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19, 27-28, 578 P.2d 1292, 1297 
(1978). 
77. 90 Wash. 2d 19, 578 P.2d 1292 (1978). 
78. Id. at 31, 578 P.2d 1298. 
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Emphasizing the importance of the agreements for the marketability 
of the city's bonds, the court enforced the contract.79 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Horowitz stated that the authority to sell bonds 
would be "meaningless" without the "necessarily implied power" to 
do "whatever is reasonably and lawfully necessary to make such bonds 
sound and salable. "80 Scott Paper Co. represents further evidence of 
the trend toward enforcing municipal contracts. 
The courts of Washington have also enforced ultra vires munici­
pal contracts when the person contracting with the municipality acted 
in good faith. 81 The most recent case that awarded recovery to a good 
faith contracting party is the 1982 Noel v. Cole,82 which involved a suit 
to enjoin the sale of timber from public land without preparation of an 
environmental impact statement. 83 In Noel, the majority opinion de­
termined that the govenmental unit possessed the general authority to 
sell the timber, but "merely. . . exercised it in an irregular manner or 
by unauthorized procedural means."84 Consequently, the court held 
that if a statutory violation involved a procedural irregularity and the 
activity was not blatantly against public policy, "a private party acting 
in good faith may recover to the extent necessary to prevent 'manifest 
unjustice' or unjust enrichment."85 
The above cases indicate that the common law of Washington has 
developed several exceptions to the general rule that municipal con­
tracts should be strictly construed. By placing the risk of termination 
on the bond purchasers, contrary to the terms of the participation 
agreement, the court in Chemical Bank ignored both the law of Wash­
ington and the realities of the market for municipal bonds. The court 
refused to enforce the agreement between the System and the partici­
pants because it could find no express statutory authority for the par­
ticipants to assume the risk of termination nor any compelling reason 
to imply such a power. 86 It could have authorized the agreement 
either as a contract relating to the sale of electricity or for the con­
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 29, 578 P.2d at 1298. In 1971, the court had recognized the need for 
financing flexibility. Public Uti!. Dist. No. I v. Taxpayers & Ratepayers, 78 Wash. 2d 724, 
726,479 P.2d 61, 63 (1971). 
81. See e.g. Renton, 67 Wash. 2d at 603, 409 P.2d at 157; Bremerton v. Kitsap ety. 
Sewer Dist., 71 Wash. 2d 689, 698-99, 430 P.2d 956, 962 (1967); Public Uti!. Dist. No. I v. 
Taxpayers & Ratepayers, 78 Wash. 2d 724, 731, 479 P.2d 61, 64 (1971); O'Connell, 83 
Wash. 2d at 804, 523 P.2d at 880; Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d at 26, 578 P.2d at 1296. 
82. 98 Wash. 2d 375, 655 P.2d 245 (1982). 
83. Id. at 377, 655 P.2d at 247. 
84. Id. at 381, 655 P.2d at 249-250. 
85. Id. (citations ommitted). 
86. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 798, 666 P.2d at 342. 
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struction of an electric plant. 87 The fact that most of the participants 
used the System merely as a financing mechanism for their chosen 
business contracts which included a known business risk strengthens 
the argument in favor of enforcement.88 
Historically, the courts of Washington have implied contractual 
authority to municipalities when necessary to provide security for 
bonds and when the contracting municipal officer had the apparent 
authority to bind the municipality.89 Moreover, Washington has vol­
untarily labeled itself a state which will enforce municipal contracts to 
the same extent as private contracts.90 The Chemical Bank court, 
therefore, should have decided differently because the agreement was 
necessary to make the bonds saleable.91 Support for a contrary deci­
sion rests on two facts: counsel for the participants represented that 
they had full legal power to enter into the agreement,92 and the gov­
erning bodies of the participants passed resolutions binding their orga­
nizations to the terms of the agreement.93 In addition, both Seattle 
and Renton represent situations in which the city had the power to 
perform the acts required by the contract, but a court held it ultra 
vires because of a procedural irregularity.94 The court in Chemical 
Bank implied that it would have enforced the agreement if the "proce­
dure" for participant control of project management had been more 
extensive.95 Although the agreement provided for such a procedure, 
the court held that it was "insufficient to allow the participants to con­
trol their risk. "96 The court's conclusion violates its own precedent 
87. At least five other courts have alJowed such contracts. See generally Johnson v. 
Piedmont Mun. Power Agency, 277 S.c. 345,287 S.E.2d 476 (1982); Texas v. Texas Mun. 
Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Commissioners of Louisiana Mun. 
Power Comm'n. v. AlJ Taxpayers, Property Owners & Citizens, 355 So.2d 578 (La. Ct. 
App. 1978); Frank v. Cody, 572 P.2d 1107 (Wyo. 1977); Thompson v. Mun. Elec. Auth., 
238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976). The Chemical Bank court cites statutes in Maine, 
Massachusetts, North Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia which specificalJy authorize munic­
ipal utilities to accept the risk of termination. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 784, 666 
P.2d at 337. 
88. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at II-II; see generally, Ferdon, supra note 
11. 
89. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text. 
91. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at V-16; Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17-18. 
92. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at V -30 to 31. 
93. 'Id. 
94. Renton, 67 Wash. 2d at 602, 409 P.2d at 157; Seattle, 173 Wash. at 500, 23 P.2d 
at 871. 
95. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 784, 666 P.2d at 337. 
96. Id. 
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and the public policy enunciated in Seattle and Renton.97 
In Chemical Bank, surprisingly little mention was made of the 
agreements serving as security for $7.2 billion in municipal revenue 
bonds.98 The requirement of paying for plants that will never produce 
electricity transformed the issuance of bonds from a favored tool for 
public financing to a point of contention for local ratepayers.99 The 
realities of the arrangement suggest that because the System had no 
revenue independent of sales to the participants, the bonds would not 
have been salable if the System had had to bear the risk of term ina­
tion.loo Further, the System performed no forecasting or planning 
services for either members or non-members.101 It makes less sense, 
therefore, for the System to bear the risk of termination, even if it were 
possible for the System to do so, since the participants were completely 
responsible for estimating their own future power requirements and 
contracting to fulfill those requirements. 102 
Throughout the opinion in Chemical Bank, the court placed no 
weight on the good or bad faith of the bondholders, even though the 
ratepayers were described as "unsuspecting individuals."103 The court 
should have acknowledged that the bondholders were unsuspecting as 
well. The bondholders purchased securities with the belief that the 
bonds were secured by the promises of participating municipal utilites 
to collect rates sufficient to service the interest and principal due on 
the bonds. 104 Similarly, the bond purchasers were aware of the Sys­
tem's promise to collect charges for electricity from the participants 
sufficient to repay the bonds.105 While the ratepayers could control 
the governing boards of the participants lO6 and the participants could 
97. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text. 
98. In one of the courts few references to the bonds, it merely stated that U[t]he Bond 
Resolution in tum ... requires [the System] to collect and set aside funds sufficient to 
make payments on the bonds." Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 777, 666 P.2d at 332. 
99. The same participants who objected to the agreement in Chemical Bank have 
financed several other projects with agreements in which they specifically accepted the risk 
of termination. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at V-14 to 18; see generally, 
Ferdon, supra note 11. 
100. Chemical's Memorandum, supra note 19 at 27; System's Memorandum, supra 
note 70, at VI-34; Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17-18; see supra note 28 and accompanying 
text. 
101. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at V-IS. 
102. See affidavit of Glendale B. Horowitz, System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at 
V-IS to 16. 
103. Chemical Bank, 99 Wash. 2d at 784, 666 P.2d at 342. 
104. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
105. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at V-16. 
106. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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control the management of the project,107 the bondholders were pow­
erless with respect to day-to-day decisions.108 The only reason most 
bondholders associated themselves with the System and the partici­
pants was because of the appearance of a conservative, tax-free 
investment. 109 
Thus, the ratepayers chose to enter the electric utility business 
and delegate management decisions to the expertise of board mem­
bers, liD while the bondholders were merely financiers looking for a 
low-risk, tax-free investment, secured by the ratemaking authority of 
municipal utiliites. 111 Because the participants were in the utility busi­
ness, the bondholders could reasonably assume that if the participants' 
committee later decided that financing would not be available to com­
plete the facility, the participants would nevertheless honor their con­
tracts and collect rates to fund the repayment of the bonds. 112 The 
court should not have forced the bondholders, therefore, to bear the 
risk of termination. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Enabling legislation granted the System the power to enter con­
tracts relating to the supply of electricity and it authorized the partici­
pants jointly to finance the construction of generating facilities. I \3 
Based on the enabling legislation, adequate statutory authority existed 
for the Supreme Court of Washington to enforce the agreement be­
tween the System and the participants. 
The Supreme Court of Washington has enforced municipal con­
tracts otherwise ultra vires when necessary to provide security for 
bonds, and when the municipal officer had the apparent authority to 
execute the contract.114 The facts surrounding Chemical Bank indi­
cate that the agreements were necessary to sell bonds and that the 
officers who signed the agreements had apparent authority.115 The 
court in Chemical Bank, however, refused to enforce the agreement. 
When a public contract is void because of a procedural error, the 
courts of Washington nevertheless uniformly allow at least partial re­
107. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
108. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at 11-2, V-6. 
109. Id. 
110. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
111. System's Memorandum, supra note 70, at V-16; Ferdon, supra note 11, at 17-18. 
112. Brown, supra note 8 at A16, col. 2. 
113. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text. 
115. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
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covery to a party acting in good faith. I 16 The court in Chemical Bank 
implied that it would have enforced the participation agreements if the 
procedure for participant control of project management had been 
more meaningful. ll7 The Chemical Bank court, therefore, failed to 
follow mandatory authority. 
Finally, because the bondholders expected a secured investment 
while the ratepayers chose to take the risk of entering the utility busi­
ness, the shortcomings as well as the benefits of the risk should have 
fallen on the ratepayers. I IS The participants freely signed contracts in 
which they knowingly accepted the risk of termination. I 19 By refusing 
to enforce the agreement, the court in Chemical Bank also failed to 
give any recognition to the good faith of the bondholders,120 although 
one reason cited for not enforcing the agreement was the good faith of 
the ratepayers. 121 The permanence of the court's break with precedent 
and common sense must await future cases. One can only hope that 
the court will reread its earlier cases before it blindly relies on Chemi­
cai Bank. 
John 1. Ferriter* 
116. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
120. See supra notes 27 & 36 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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